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 Monographs on Cicero’s rhetorical studies are, 
all too often, silent about the progymnasmata. 




1. “Anti-rhetorical” dialogical form of De oratore and traces 
of school exercises in Cicero’s rhetorical studies 
 
Cicero’s dialogue De oratore is commonly considered a work of an 
exceptional orator, whose view on eloquence is clearly distanced from the 
one presented in the rhetoric handbooks. The choice of the dialogue form 
itself is very symptomatic. According to Jakob Wisse: 
 
These symbolic function of the dialogue form, the ‘anti-rhetorical’ and 
the political, are clearly important. Yet the dialogue is even more than a 
meaningful, symbolic form superimposed on what could still be regarded 
as a regular treatise. It is used by Cicero to present his views in ways that 
would not have been possible in a manuallike work.1 
 
Moreover, the author of De oratore on numerous occasions questions the 
usefulness and completeness of the prescriptions given in traditional 
handbooks as well as he criticizes the rhetoricians, accusing them of 
conveying the knowledge which is hardy useful in practical orator’s work at 
forum.2   
Cicero deliberately makes Crassus a leading character of his dialogue, as 
he had a profound knowledge of the views of Peripatetics, Stoics and 
                                                            
1 Wisse (2002a), 379. 
2 See De orat. 1.86-87; 2.62-64, 75-76, 111, 117, 132-134; 3.54, 81 and 92-94. cf. 
Wisse (2002a), 346. 
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especially Academics,3 and still being a Roman orator, he “wanted to be 
thought of, not so much as someone who had learned nothing, but rather as 
one who looked down on these things.”4 Therefore, Crassus of Cicero may 
require the orator to possess a broad knowledge of philosophy, politics, 
history and law and, at the same time, he claims that the talented orator, who 
is practicing eloquence, would be able to beat in the discussion the most 
erudite philosophers.5 Ipso facto he takes the floor in a struggle between the 
philosophers and the rhetoricians, the struggle that apparently leaves no place 
for technical guidance of rhetoric textbooks. Still Crassus agrees that at the 
professional Greek eloquence teachers “there was, apart from this exercise of 
the tongue, still some learning to be found and some knowledge worthy of 
human culture.” 6  This “knowledge worthy of human culture” comprises 
definitely the knowledge of rhetoric preliminary exercises, called in the 
imperial times progymnasmata, that were widely taught at the schools of 
grammarians and rhetoricians: maybe not so in 91 BC when De oratore took 
place, but for sure in 55 BC, when Cicero wrote his dialogue.7 
                                                            
3 See De orat.  1.45-47. 
4 De orat. 2.4: “Crassus non tam existimari vellet non didicisse quam illa despicere et 
nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Graecis anteferre.” (tr. by May and 
Wisse (2001), 126) 
5 See De orat. 3.79. cf. also Kennedy who, interpreting the passage from De oratore, 
writes : “We see here that characteristic view of many Romans that it is good to 
know something about philosophy, and many other subjects, but not to become too 
deeply involved in its study or, like Cato the Younger, to become too extreme in 
applying its doctrines.” Kennedy (1994), 146. 
6 De orat. 3.94: “nam apud Graecos, cuicuimodi essent, videbam tamen esse praeter 
hanc exercitationem linguae doctrinam aliquam et humanitate dignam scientiam” (tr. 
by May and Wisse (2001), 254). 
7 There are traces of elementary exercises in rhetoric among others in Rhet. Her.: 1.8, 
12-13 (in the theory of narratio), 1.9, 14 – 10, 17 (virtues of narratio: narratio 
dilucida, brevis and veri similis - cf. Theon, Prog. 5, Patillon (1997), 40-48), 2.30, 
47-49 and 3.13, 24 (progymnasmatic elements in the characteristic of loci communes) 
and 4.42, 54 and 44, 56-57 (characteristic of expolitio resembles the 
progymnasmatic theory of chreia and sentence - cf. Theon, Prog. 3, Patillon (1997), 
18-19), as well as in Cicero’s De inv. 1.25 (apologus, fabula and inrisio bears a 
likeness to the fable and division of narrations in Greek progymnasmata), 1.27 
(analgies in the theory of narratio), 1.28-30 (virtues of narratio: narratio aperta, 
brevis and probabilis), 1.75-76 and 78 (characteristic of expolitio) and 1.100-109 
(progymnasmatic character of loci communes). For more see Awianowicz (2008), 
30-31; Bonner (1977), 250-251; Kennedy (1994), 202 and Kennedy (1999), 27; 
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The relation with progymnasmata is seen in Crassus advice to study 
different authors “for the sake of practice, praise, expound, correct, criticize 
and refute them.” 8  The preserved Greek handbooks of progymnasmata: 
Theon of the first century AD, Pseudo-Hermogenes of the second or third 
century AD and Aphthonios of the second half of the fourth century AD 
contain both theory and examples of a praise (the praise of the writer 
Thucydides is an example of Aphthonios works), an invective and a 
refutation (at two latter authors). 9  In book 2 the other of main dialogue 
characters, Antonius, defines the subject of an indefinite issue (quaestiones 
infinitae) similarly to thesis in the handbooks of Greek rhetoricians (2.42). 
He also mentions examples typical to the progymnasmatic tradition “Is 
eloquence to be persuaded?”, “Are high honours to be persuaded?”10 as well 
as he discusses so called theoretical theseis on the size of Sun and shape of 
Earth (2.66). The theoretical and practical or political theseis11 seem to be 
also an inspiration for Crassus reasoning on simple questions (3.116-117). 
The progymnasmata recommendations on praise and comparison are also 
present in a part of Antonius characteristic of a demonstrative genre.12 On the 
other hand, while speaking about loci communes, which “partly consist of 
bitter, amplified condemnations of, or complaints about, vices and offences, 
which are usually left unanswered and are indeed unanswerable – such as 
                                                                                                                                
Kraus (2005), 160 and Patillon (1997), XII; cf. also Suetonius, De gramm. et rhet. 
25.8. 
8 De orat. 1. 158: “exercitationis causa laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi, 
refellendi.” (tr. by May and Wisse (2001), 93) 
9  See Theon, Prog. 9, Patillon (1997), 74-78 (enkomion and psogos); Pseudo-
Hermogenes, Prog. V, Patillon (2008), 190-191 (anaskeué and kataskeué) and Prog. 
VII, Patillon (2008), 194-198 (enkomion); Aphthonios, Prog. V, Patillon (2008), 
120-126 (anaskeué), Prog. VIII and IX, Patillon (2008), 131-140 (enkomion and 
psogos). 
10 De orat. 2.42: “expetendane esset eloquentia? expetendine honores?” (tr. by May 
and Wisse (2001), 135); see also Theon, Prog. XI, Patillon (1997), 82-94; Pseudo-
Hermogenes, Prog. XI, Patillon (2008), 203-205 and Aphthonios, Prog. XIII, 
Patillon (2008), 152-157. 
11 For “practical” (gr. praktikh/) see Theon, Prog. 11, Patillon (1997), 83-84; for 
“political” (gr. politikh/) see Pseudo-Hermogenes, Prog. XI, Patillon (2008), 204-
205 and Aphthonios, Prog. XIII, Patillon (2008), 152. cf. Awianowicz (2008): 32 
and 72-73. 
12 See De orat. 2.347-348; cf. Theon, Prog. 9, Patillon (1997), 74-75 and Prog. 10, 
Patillon (1997), 78-82; Pseudo-Hermogenes, Prog. VIII, Patillon (2008), 198-199 
and Aphthonios, Prog. VIII and IX, Patillon (2008), 131-140.   
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attacks on embezzlement, on treason, and on murder,” 13  Crassus gets 
particularly close to the theory of a common-place (gr. koino\v to/pov) as seen 
by Aphthonios, who defines them as: “language amplifying evils that are 
attached to something.”14 
 
 
2. De oratore 1.175-184. School theseis and controversiae 
hidden amongst real trials 
 
Since the remarks that are close to the progymnasmata theory can be found 
in each of three De oratore books, then the question should be posed whether 
the passus on the need for knowledge of the law (1.166-203) actually 
threatens the whole rhetorical education model of the time or it rather 
undermines so called rhetores latini, who, according to what Crassus says in 
book 3, cannot even provide “some knowledge worthy of human culture” 
(3.94)? The Greek rhetoricians in course of rhetoric exercises have 
distinguished so called examination of laws. Theon has described this 
exercise most precisely and found out that: “scrutiny of laws is two-fold; for 
either they are being introduced and proposed or they are already in effect.”15 
Since Cicero dedicates his dialogue mainly to a forensic orator and he 
constructs Crassus’ reasoning on the need to know the law over the court 
eloquence context, therefore it is reasonable to have a closer look at the 
examples of ten legal cases (1.175-184) cited in this reasoning as the possible 
progymnasmatic exercises in the assessment of laws that “are already in 
effect.” Theon describes these exercises as follows: 
 
                                                            
13 De orat. 3.106:  “communes a veteribus nominati sunt; quorum partim habent 
vitiorum et peccatorum acrem quandam cum amplificatione incusationem aut 
querelam, contra quam dici nihil solet nec potest, ut in depeculatorem, in 
proditorem, in parricidam.” (tr. by May and Wisse (2001), 256) cf. Aphtonios, Prog. 
VII, Patillon (2008), 126-127: “Ei]rhtai de\ ou[twv a)po\ tou= koin$\ pa=sin a(rmo/ttein 
toi=v metasxou=si tou= au)tou= pra/gmatov: o( ga\r kata\ prodo/tou lo/gov koin$= 
pa=sin h[rmose toi=v koinwnou=si th=v pra/cewv.” 
14  Prog. VII, Patillon (2008), 126: “Koino/v e)sti to/pov lo/gov au)chtiko\v tw=n 
proso/ntwn kakw=n” (tr. by Kennedy (2003), 105); see also Awianowicz (2008), 59-
60. 
15  Prog. 12, Patillon (1997), 95: “Tw=n de\ no/mwn e)ce/tasiv dixw=v: h} ga\r 
ei)sferome/nwn au)tw=n kai\ tiqeme/nwn h} keime/nwn h]dh.” (tr. by Kennedy (2003),  62) 
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Concerning those already in effect, debates take place in court by those 
pleading, not to abolish the laws entirely, but advancing on each side 
what is more profitable interpretation and the speakers amplify what 
seems to have been enacted by the law and conceal opposing 
interpretations.16 
 
To succeed, one not only needs to know the legal acts but also need to 
interpret them. According to Cicero this ability is impossible to gain by the 
court practice alone, as he accuses those who act in the forum and in front of 
tribunals having not graduated from the law studies before of being lazy and 
shameless (1.172). The solution is to study the rule books, mentioned in the 
further part of Crassus’ argument (1.192-198) and consultation with the 
respectful lawyers (1.199-200), as well as examination of laws that Cicero 
does not directly refer to. It seems that amongst ten listed legal cases the first, 
the third and the last one (1.175, 177 and 183) are of clearly educational 
significance17. Unlike the other ones, they do not contain the names of people 
engaged in the cases – as in the example 2 (1.176: Claudii vs. Marcelli), 4 
(1.178: Orata represented by Crassus vs. Gratidianus represented by 
Antonius), 5 (1.179: Buculeius vs. Fufius), 6 (1.180: Curius represented by 
Crassus vs. Coponius represented by Scaevola Pontifex18) and 7 (Rutilius vs. 
Mancinus). Unlike examples 8 and 9 (1.182 and 183) they have some case 
circumstances described making them more concrete. Therefore they can be 
regarded as examples of thesis – one of two most advanced progymnasmata – 
or controversiae – declamations practiced in the rhetorical schools after 
progymnasmata. 
Let us recall these three examples then. The first one regards the case of a 
soldier whom the listeners seem to do know (as he is described with the 
pronoun ille – “illius militis”). His father having received a false message 
(falsus nuntius) from the army (ab exercitu) on his son’s death,  
 
                                                            
16  Prog. 12, Patillon (1997), 95: “Peri\ de\ tw=n h]dh keime/nwn [no/mwn] 
ai( a)mfisbhth/seiv gi/nontai toi=v dikazome/noiv ou) pantelw=v a)nairou=sai tou\v 
no/mouv, a_ll ) e(kate/r% pro\v to\ lusitele/steron e)c|hgou/menai, kai\ au]contain me\n 
o[sa u(pe\r au)tou= gegra/fqai dokei=, sugkru/ptontai de\ ta\ e)nanti/a.” 
17  All theses three cases arose, as Elaine Fantham observes, “from problems of 
indentity.” Fantham (2004), 117. 
18 The causa Curiana was a famous trial argued before the Centumviral Court, but – 
as observes Frier (1985), 136 – “its implications were shrouded in ambiguity” and 
as such can’t be regarded as a universal exercise in oratory or jurisprudence. See 
also La Bua (2006), 188-192. 
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believing the story, changed his will and appointed another heir as he 
thought appropriate, then subsequently died. When the soldier returned 
home, he filed suit by means by legis actio for recovery of his patrimony, 
for though a son, he had no share in the inheritance according to the will. 
 
Crassus adds that the case was heard by the Council of One Hundred and it 
was on a civil law: “whether or not a son could be excluded from a share of 
his father’s property when the father in his will had neither specified him as a 
heir nor disinherited him by name.”19 The authors of a commentary: Anton D. 
Leeman, Harm Pinkster and Hein L. W. Nelson20 are right pointing out that 
Valerius Maximus has described the same case and reported the soldier’s 
victory (7.7, 1). Naturally, we may see the case of the soldier recalled by both 
authors as one of the famous legal cases held at the second or at the turn of 
the second and first century BC. However if we take a closer look to soldier’s 
reasoning, cited by Valerius Maximus, where he claims that he had sacrificed 
his youth to his fatherland, he had suffered the hardship and dangers; he also 
shown his war wound scars, then it seems clear that in case of this suit held in 
front of the Council of One Hundred the decision whether lack of bequest on 
the son who had been presumed dead is legally binding was equally 
important as the settlement of a moral issue: whether the hero fighting for his 
fatherland may be deprived of his patrimony? This approach to the case goes 
over the law interpretation alone and as such is a perfect example of a school 
exercise in declamation, probably similar to controversia 8 of book 1. Ter 
fortis or 5 of book 8. Fortis nolens ad patrem fortem redire by Seneca the 
Elder. The example 1.8 describes a father who struggles to hold his son back 
from going to war since the law relieves from the military service those who 
were fighting bravely three times (“Qui ter fortiter fecerit, militia vacet”). 
The example 8.5 regards the disinherited son, a brave soldier, who does not 
want to come back to his father, as the latter had not wanted his son to return 
home as a reward for his war acts.  
 The third of the ten examples concerns exiled foreigner “who had come to 
live in Rome, having the right to do so provided that he attach himself to 
someone who would act as a kind of patronus, subsequently died without 
                                                            
19 De orat. 1.175: “pater eius re credita testamentum mutasset et, quem ei visum esset, 
fecisset heredem essetque ipse mortuus, res delata est ad centumviros, cum miles 
domum revenisset egissetque lege in hereditatem paternam testamento exheres 
filius? nempe in ea causa quaesitum est de iure civili, possetne paternorum 
bonorum exheres esse filius, quem pater testamento neque heredem neque 
exheredem scripsisset nominatim.” (tr. by May and Wisse (2001), 98) 
20 See Leeman, Pinkster, Nelson (1985), 61. 
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leaving a will.”21  The only concrete information in this case is Crassus’ 
mention of the case being heard by the Council of One Hundred. There is no 
need to give the detailed information on person, time and place of the law 
suit, as the most important is the knowledge and a proper interpretation of the 
law regarding attachments of client to patron. Therefore, it is a sui generis 
example of quaestio legalis (gr. zh/thma nomiko/n) known from Hermagoras 
theory which has been analysed by Cicero in his early handbook De 
inventione (2.116-122), as well as in the book 2 of De oratore (2.110-111). 
The third example regarding a particular law case, however lacking the 
details of parties involved in a case and the case itself, is — listed as a tenth 
one — the legal case of a head of a household (pater familias), who came to 
Rome from Spain and “although leaving a pregnant wife in the province, he 
married another woman in Rome without sending the first wife a notice of 
divorce. He died without a will, while a son had been born to each of the 
women.”22 Now, the result of the case is dependent on the knowledge of 
divorce law where the decision whether the second woman is a wife or a 
lover and her child is a legal son or a bastard is based on a judgment to accept 
the divorce on the basis of a notice of divorce alone or on a fact that the new 
marriage automatically annuls the previous one. Using the words “in our 
father’s time” (“memoria patrum”) Crassus seems to make believe that the 
case is real23. However, reading into a particular historical case here is quite 
useless, as the very style the main interlocutor of Cicero’s dialogue uses to 
describe the issue of the other woman and her son (1.184): 
 
[…] pater familias qui ex Hispania Romam venisset, cum uxorem 
praegnantem in provincia reliquisset, Romae alteram duxisset neque 
nuntium priori remisisset, mortuusque esset intestato et ex utraque filius 
natus esset […] 
 
resembles the abstracts of controversiae of Seneca the Elder, i.e. controversia 
6 of book 4. Indiscreti filius et privignus: 
 
                                                            
21 De orat. 1. 177: “qui Romam in exsilium venisset, cui Romae exsulare ius esset, si 
se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicavisset, intestatoque esset mortuus.” (tr. by 
May and Wisse (2001), 98) 
22 De orat. 1.183: “cum uxorem praegnantem in provincia reliquisset, Romae alteram 
duxisset neque nuntium priori remisisset, mortuusque esset intestato et ex utraque 
filius natus esset.” (tr. by May and Wisse (2001), 101) 
23 cf. Leeman, Pinkster, Nelson (1985), 48. 
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Quidam mortua uxore quae in partu perierat, alteram duxit; puerum rus 
misit. ex illa subinde filium sustulit. utrumque puerum ruri educavit; post 
longum tempus redierunt similes. quaerenti matri uter eius sit non indicat. 
 
The other details may be found in the second example (1.176) where 
nomen gentilicium Claudii may be seen as a symbol of any clan, while 
cognomen Marcelli – of any branch of a clan. Still, if one constrains himself 
from searching for particular, historical Claudii and Marcelli, there is a 
general legal issue here: who should succeed to a childless son of a freemen – 
the closest relatives of the patron or a whole clan? The generality of this 
example is, therefore, none the less than the example of inexpedient law, 
mentioned by Theon, which requires “pulling down part of the city wall for a 
procession in honour of an Olympic victor.”24 
The analogy to progymnasmata by Theon and controversiae by Seneca is 
even more probable, as Seneca himself testifies that what he called by the 
name of controversiae, were called legal cases (causae) by Cicero and theseis 
before his times.25 Therefore one can see the above discussed examples as 
both individual declamations practiced by adult speakers at home,26 and the 
topics commonly known from the rhetoricians’ schools. It is also confirmed 
by, typical to theseis, lack of circumstances in examples 1, 3 and 10 (the 
information on the father coming to Rome from Spain adds nothing to the 
case) and using the pronoun ille with respect to the soldier of the first 
example which suggests that he was well known person, also he was not 
called by his name, alike the other characters from the majority of legal cases 
exemplified in the first book of De oratore. Therefore, it is very likely that 
both the case of the soldier and the legal status of bigamist’s sons were well 
known to Crassus auditory as they were often used in rhetoric exercises. It is 
enough to say that as much as 15 of controversiae by Seneca27 concerns 
entering to the family or disinheritance.28 
                                                            
24 Prog. 12, Patillon (1997), 101 (the text preserved only in the Armenian version 
translated into French by Patillon and Bolognesi and into English by Kennedy 
(2003), 65). 
25 Seneca the Elder, Controversiae I, pr. 12: “[…] quales ante Ciceronem dicebantur, 
quas thesis vocabant. […] controversias nos dicimus: Cicero causas vocabat.” cf. 
Kennedy (1994), 167. 
26 cf. Seneca the Elder, Controversiae I, pr. 12 and Cicero, Ad Att. 9.4, 1, where he 
spokes about exercises in theseis practiced by him in 49 BC. 
27 See Controversiae 1.1, 4, 6, 8; 2.9, 10, 12; 3.3; 4.3, 5; 5.2; 6.1, 2; 7.16 and 8.5. 
28  About topics of Roman declamations and their legal and juridical aspects see 
Lentano (2014). 
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Jakob Wisse remarks: 
 
Intellectually, Cicero regarded virtually all rhetoricians, Greek and 
Roman, and wherever they worked, with equal contempt. This is clearest 
from De oratore, the work most concerned with his stance towards 
standard rhetoric; the hackneyed rules that they taught are constantly 
criticized, inter alia, as being totally divorced from the real life of an 
orator in the forum.29 
 
As much as the researcher’s opinion on the general meaning of Cicero’s 
dialogue is right, still the examples of legal cases of book I and numerous 
cited passuses convergent with the progymnasmatic theory prove the other, 
equal important aim of De oratore, i.e. popularization of the Greek rhetoric 
amongst Roman elite or at least that part of them that was chosen by Cicero 
as a valuable auditory for a Roman orator – a lawyer and a politician. He both 
attempts to authenticate the Greek eloquence in the eyes of Roman nobilitas 
by introducing Crassus and Antonius as chief interlocutors of the dialogue 
and he spares them partly his own erudition, and to authenticate the exercises, 
inspired by the Greek theseis, in assessment of particular legal controversies 
by including them in the real reports on legal disputes of the second century 
BC and the 90-ties of the first century BC. “Anti-rhetorical” dialogue De 
oratore may therefore, paradoxically, be seen as an important stage of  
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Ten Legal Cases in Cicero’s De oratore 1.175-184: 
Examples of Famous Historical Trials or  






In the first book of Cicero’s De oratore (1.175-184) Crassus criticizes the 
shameless (impudentia) of those advocates who neglect the civil law and 
illustrates his argumentation with 10 legal cases. The aim of the paper is to 
discuss the function of all of them, arguing that they were not only famous cases 
well known to the interlocutors of the Cicero’s dialogue, which have taken place 
in September 91 BC, but also could be regarded as theseis, causae or 
controversiae  practiced in schools of rhetoric in the 50’s of the first Century BC. 
when Cicero wrote De oratore and well known most of all from Seneca’s 
Controversiae. e.g. the pronoun “ille” in the first case (1.175: causa illius militis) 
can suggest the well known real case (cf. Valerius Maximus, 7.7.1), but also a 
case known because similar topics were studied in schools of rhetoric, the 
examples concerns exiled foreigner “who had come to live in Rome, having the 
right to do so provided that he attach himself to someone who would act as a kind 
of patronus, subsequently died without leaving a will” (1.177) contains no 
detailed information on person, time and place of the law suit and as such can be 
regarded as sui generis example of quaestio legalis analysed by Cicero in De 
inventione (2.116-122), while famous causa Curiana (1.180) was already 
analyzed (without names of parties and advocates) by him in De inventione (2. 
122-127) as an example of controversia ex scripto et sententia.  
The analysis of 10 legal cases / controversies shows that Cicero’s goal is to 
authenticate the exercises, inspired by the Greek school theseis, in assessment of 
particular legal controversies by including them in the real reports on legal 
disputes of the second century BC. and the nineties of the first century BC. 
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